This would also have to be done anyway for the Design A option but only for a change of the transmission and not for the engine. When Design A was amended with the casemate mm further back due to a design change over the gun mounting, it resolved the centre-of-gravity issues and also reduced the gun overhang at the front. Design B, therefore, offered little in the way of advantages over Design A and a whole slew of major and unresolved problems. With an urgency to get this heavy Design A went on to be the Jagdtiger and Design B was dropped.
Aders at Henschel und Sohn. This means it is almost certainly from Dr. Aders as well, as he was the chief designer at Henschel. The April vehicle was an engine-forward, rear casemate design with the This cut-away reduced the point at which the gun would foul on the hull during depression. Design B might have failed but the idea of sticking the This time it was not from Henschel but from Krupp. There had been problems with the The gun suggested by Colonel Crohn was the The extremely long barrel now projected nearly 5 m beyond the front of the tank, bringing the center of gravity much further forwards, leaving a great strain on the front suspension.
The solution, in one way, was obvious — put the gun further back. In fact, mount the gun in a casemate at the back of the hull and, in doing so, move the engine forwards.
This was then unsurprisingly exactly what Krupp suggested. This would reduce the overhang at the front to just 2 m or so and bring the center-of-gravity further back too. The drawbacks though, would be the same as before on the Design B and, on top of this, Krupp foresaw an increase in weight too on top of the weight of the heavier gun.
Krupp said that it would consult with Henschel on the matter but, as Henschel had already considered this problem, it is no surprise that this idea died as quickly as it started.
Because the designs were both rejected,k as both had so many faults and neither drawing has survived, it is perhaps no surprise that the descriptions provided, along with a knowledge of the development of the For that design, the engine was brought forward and the gun taken to the rear.
A look at the engine position in the Grille, therefore, provides a view of what the front section of Design B might have looked like with the engine brought forwards. Only if, and when, the original drawings are found can it be known for sure how close this impression is to reality.
Designed by Henschel exactly as was actually demanded, it was simply surpassed by the alternative design Design A , the design which went on to be the Jagdtiger. Using a rear casemate design with the engine forward would have allowed the use of the Nonetheless, the design caused other problems relating to maintenance, the need for new component parts and really was not needed.
There had been serious delays already in the Jagdtiger program at the time and As it was, the Jagdtiger would follow a more conventional layout and the Design B of April was dropped. Ryan, funded by our Patreon Campaign. Spielberger, W. Heavy Jagdpanzer: Development, Production, Operations. German Tank and Antitank.
WE Inc. And is jagdpanzer E is a design that never made it to production or prototype I have searched about it but does not seem to be a real tank or design.
Your email address will not be published. Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment. Close Menu WW1 Tanks. German Empire. Kingdom of Denmark. Kingdom of Italy. Kingdom of Spain. A production order followed shortly thereafter for vehicles starting with chassis number for the program with V1 and V2 using serial numbers and respectively, confirmed by a later Tiger II Production table.
Production started in October with the trials vehicles by which time, Tiger III was now Tiger II and the contract had been extended to produce a total of 1, vehicles. Production, like for most German vehicles, was slow. The production target from October through May called for Tiger IIs to be built, yet just 38 were ready by the end of this period, meaning the two Schwere-Panzerabteilung Heavy tank regiments earmarked to receive these vehicles 50 each in order to be ready for combat in Spring 44 were not available to the army as a resource.
By the time of D-Day in June , less than half a dozen Tiger IIs just 5 had been delivered by 1st June were in theater and none of these were fully operational due to technical problems.
These problems continued through the Summer of and into autumn, until Henschel managed to resolve production and technical problems. Despite these raids, in January , projections for Tiger II production by Henschel were for 40 and 35 vehicles in January and February respectively, with an increase in production month on month thereafter reaching per month by August These fanciful projections were little more than wishful thinking and, in February, they had been revised down significantly.
None were expected in January due to bombing, followed by 50 in February and reaching a peak of just 70 in April before a final group of just 47 in June. That meant just were expected for production in from Henschel with production to be supported by the Nibelungenwerke factory.
Production at the Nibelungenwerke was due to start in April with 13 tanks and 40 the following month, for an additional 53 tanks.
With the severely deteriorating war situation, desperate measures were initiated with an emergency production order Panzer Notprogramm placed on 1st February By this time, Henschel confirmed that Tiger IIs series tanks and 3 trials vehicles had been produced, but the Allied bombing was so disruptive to production that not only were plans made to shift some production, but also the total number planned for completion was reduced to just By the end of February , production figures had been revised once more to just 45 that month, followed by 50 in March and April and 60 per month thereafter until September.
This meant were being planned, although Henschel confirmed that Heydekampf had extended the Panzer Notprogramm from to vehicles, an additional to be built on top of what had already been produced up to that point this later appears to have been reduced to Out of these Tiger IIs, were to be built at the Nibelungenwerke plant producing 25 per month from May through August. Nibelungenwerke was a logical choice to support production, as it was already responsible for Jagdtiger production on the Tiger II chassis, but even so, no actual Tiger II production ever took place at that plant.
By the end of March , Allied forces had captured Kassel and overrun the Henschel tank works. All Tiger II production for Germany stopped, although the exact number produced is hard to pin down, with figures varying from upwards. The historian Horst Schiebert puts the number produced at Source: Schneider Looking at the serial numbers for production through the excellent work of Jentz and Doyle, by the end of February , Tiger II serial number was produced, which would put the total at Tiger IIs produced before March A further 30 vehicles were accepted by the inspectorate in March, prior to capture by Allied forces, bringing the total up to Tiger IIs produced, although the number delivered is lower.
They assembled the Tiger II parts supplied from a variety of contractors and the primary elements of the tank, the armored hulls and turrets, were supplied to them for fitting. Partially completed Serien-Turm turrets at the Henschel factory March Source: fprado Production of the armored hulls and turrets was primarily conducted by Krupp in Essen, manufacturing armored turret-body pairs by the end of February , a figure which includes the 50 turrets produced for the VK The firm of Wegmann was also involved in the turret production, taking the armored turret bodies and working on them before sending them to Henschel for completion and installation.
Krupp itself produced hulls and turrets by the end of February , which includes the 50 turrets produced for the VK Henschel started production ahead of those other plants and on a larger scale, but the contribution of D.
Careful attention to the figures though shows an important feature. Adding together hull production for Krupp, D. Undoubtedly the best-known variant of the Tiger II is the Jagdtiger, which was even heavier as a result of a huge and heavily armored casemate on top of the central part of the hull mounting a Just 74 of these vehicles were built and the weight and reliability problems which plagued the Tiger II were compounded by the additional weight of the Jagdtiger.
It remained the heaviest operational and mass-produced armored fighting vehicle AFV of WW2 but it delivered very little success. As well as the company HQ and platoon commander version of the Tiger II, there was also a command version of the tank as well. This command tank variant was a little more extensively modified than simply adding a FuG 2 radio set, as it required the addition of wiring, antennas, and a GG auxiliary generator, all of which took up additional space.
To account for this extra internal space requirement, the Panzerbefehlswagen Tiger Ausf. There were two versions of the Panzerbefehlswagen Tiger Ausf. B: the first, the Sd. From the front, the massive and imposing shape of the Panzerbefehlswagen Tiger Ausf.
B pictured 13th August is almost indistinguishable from the standard Tiger II. Only the antennae at the back give it away. This second antenna distinguishes the Panzerbefehlswagen Tiger Ausf. B from other Tiger Ausf. The Panzerbefehlswagen Tiger Ausf. Although every tenth Tiger Ausf. B was intended to be outfitted as a Panzerbefehlswagen, production records for Henschel show it was actually every twentieth vehicle.
Seen from behind, the antenna positions on the rear hull roof rear right and rear-centre give this Tiger II of s. Faced with a crippling shortage of heavy tracked armored recovery vehicles, the German military in WW2 ended up having to abandon or destroy hundreds of its own tanks to prevent them from falling into enemy hands.
Often a breakdown was the result of the failure of a single component like a final drive, yet with little time to recover a vehicle to a secure locale to fix it, the entire tank would be lost. There was no recovery-version of the Tiger I, and crews had actually been ordered not to tow one Tiger with another in case it simply caused another vehicle to be lost.
Certainly, no production version of an ARV Tiger II variant was made but with a serious shortage of heavy armored recovery vehicles, it is perhaps no surprise that such an idea was floated around. A British investigation in July interviewing men at the factories and examining recovered documents etc. Quite how far that plan got is not made clear and no drawings, models, or mockups were found.
Each platoon of tanks was supposed to consist of tanks. This unit was never formally issued with the Tiger II, as it had been operating Tiger Is throughout and On 10th April , however, the unit was at Rechberg in a totally shattered form. The entire strength of the unit was just 2 Tiger Is. During a maintenance period, the maintenance facility there provided it with a single Tiger II which had been made operational, bringing the unit strength to 2 Tiger Is and 1 Tiger II. Several other vehicles were improvised by the unit here as it tried to regain combat strength, including the installation of some quadruple flak guns onto some captured Soviet tanks, but it was an effort in vain.
The unit saw no more combat and blew up its last tanks on 8th May. The remnants of the unit then surrendered to US forces and were promptly handed over to the Soviets.
Following the disaster at Beja though, the unit was down to a single company of tanks. It was reconstructed as a formation from the end of June to the start of August , receiving a full complement of 45 Tiger IIs. The first use of these tanks was a disaster, however, as most of them broke down with final-drive failure on a 50 km road march from being offloaded by train at Jedreczewo on the way to the Baranow Bridgehead near Warsaw, Poland. Here, final drive problems continued and only 8 tanks were operational.
Three of those tanks were left burning when the unit was ambushed by one or more Soviet Ts belonging to the 53rd Guards Tank Brigade near the town of Obledo. The losses were all due to the ammunition in the turret catching fire following a hit on the side of the turret. Subsequently, tanks were prohibited from carrying ammunition there, reducing ammunition capacity to 68 rounds.
The forces opposing s. Later in the battle, these tank forces were supplemented by a platoon of IS-2 tanks. During the 3 days of the battle, 6 GTC reported capturing 7 Germans, killing another , and destroying 6 tanks without the loss of a single tank.
It was not until the middle of August that the unit received the spare final drives they needed, but the vehicles were still misused in unsuitable terrain, leading to further losses. By 1st September, just 26 Tiger IIs remained operational.
Following the losses through August and September , the unit was resupplied with Tiger Is formerly from s. Disaster followed once more in January during an attack at Lisow conducted without adequate preparation and reconnaissance. The Soviets ambushed and destroyed almost the whole battalion by using IS tanks and concealed anti-tank guns. Nonetheless, the battalion reported destroying a number of enemy tanks during the period of contact. Its last Tiger II was lost on 14th January, when the ton bridge it was crossing collapsed.
Late-model Tiger Is and all Tiger IIs were fitted with a trio of mounting brackets on the turret roof for the assembly of a field crane for maintenance. Here, an unidentified Tiger II undergoes extensive work in the field, lifting off the engine decking. Note the front right drive sprocket is off and the position of the tracks would indicate both final drives are undergoing repair as well. Source: Schneider A Tiger 2 belonging to s.
According to German sources, this tank was knocked out by a 76 mm anti-tank gun, but Soviet records indicate it was knocked out by a bomb hit to the engine.
Source: Panzerwrecks 3. This unit had previously been operating the Tiger I as s. The 1st Company of s. Three days later, four of these vehicles supported a counterattack at Guitrancourt, where they destroyed a single M4 Sherman.
Two of the Tiger IIs then attacked Melier and one was lost to fire from an anti-tank gun, reducing the company strength to One of these two replacement tanks was lost just a few days later, on 26th August, at Meulan after being hit repeatedly by enemy fire and crippled. Another Tiger II was lost when it rolled over trying to avoid an attack by Allied fighter-bombers. On 29th August, the 1st Company was supporting a counterattack by a Luftwaffe field division in the area to the west of Magny-en-Vexin when it ran into a wall of coordinated anti-tank fire.
Several of the Tiger IIs were crippled by this fire and two, which could not be recovered, were blown up. In an effort to maneuver, the Tiger II conducted a sharp turn and the final drive failed, incapacitating the tank. The crew then abandoned the tank. This vehicle was later recovered and is now on display at the Tank Museum, Bovington.
Tiger II number of s. It now resides at the Tank Museum, Bovington. Source: Schneider Continual contact with the British and concentrated fire crippling the tanks had diminished the original 14 tanks to just 6 tanks after 29th August, and another was knocked out the following day along the road towards Gissors. On 3rd September, the unit made contact with US armored forces and reported the destruction of 2 M4 Shermans northeast of the town of Rozoy.
By 5th September, down to just 2 operational tanks, one had to be abandoned near la Capelle when it ran out of fuel and it was blown up. This tank was subsequently recovered and is now on display at the Panzer Museum Munster. The unit was renamed from s. Abt between the end of September and end of November , when it was being reconstituted to operate Tiger IIs.
Eleven more Tiger II were issued, handed over by s. The Ardennes offensive began poorly for s. Others suffered damage to their final drives on the march to contact with enemy forces. Further air attacks took place against them the next day when crossing the Ambleve River at Stavelot. As the tanks maneuvered to safety, US anti-tank guns opened fire and one Tiger II became stuck in a building and had to be abandoned.
Tiger II number belonging to s. Source: Schneider Air raids continued up to contact between s. One Tiger II was lost to enemy fire near the bridge at Stavelot and two tanks, belonging to 3rd Company, were hit multiple times by fire from vehicles of the US rd Tank Destroyer Battalion.
Both were damaged but were later recovered, having managed to destroy one of the American tank destroyers. More contact followed over the next few days as the Germans tried to press their assault and deal with US counterattacks. On 22nd December, one Tiger II was lost and had to be abandoned when a 90 mm shell smashed the right drive sprocket and another tank, after receiving numerous hits, was crippled both in mobility and firepower through damage to the tracks and having had the muzzle brake shot off.
That vehicle was later recovered to the USA for testing. Tiger number of s. Source: Schneider. This tank is currently preserved in the United States. Source: Schneider By 28th December, s. Two days later, on 30th December, all of the tanks of the 1st Company of s. The next major action for the unit and their Tiger IIs took place on 17th February after they had been transferred to the Eastern Front.
Here, with 19 Tiger IIs from s. Having created a bridgehead, the attack pressed on and captured Parkany, destroying several enemy tanks in the process. Despite starting this operation with over 30 tanks, by 3rd March just 4 remained operational and the unit had to march to the southeast to form up at Polgardi in order to relieve the pressure of the Soviet assault on the city of Budapest Operation Fruhlingserwachen — Spring Awakening on 6th March.
Operational levels were still low for this operation and stalled on 9th March, when the unit encountered a Soviet defensive line of anti-tank guns at Janos Mjr.
Two Tiger IIs were so seriously damaged by this encounter that they had to go back for depot-level maintenance. Despite the strong Soviet defence, the Operation had managed to create a bridgehead on the other side of the Sio River near the town on Simontornya and a brief period of low-intensity conflict persisted from 11th to 14th March.
In this time, valuable maintenance was carried out, bringing the unit additional operational vehicles. On 19th March, following the Soviet counter-offensive, the I.
Panzer-Korps, of which s. During that move, conducted at night to avoid enemy aircraft, several of the valuable Tiger IIs broke down or ran out of fuel. With no recovery vehicles available, these had to be blown up. Defensive actions took place near to Inota the next day.
A successful encounter between one of those Tiger IIs and a Soviet armored force on 20th March resulted in 15 Soviet tanks claimed to have been knocked out by just the single Tiger II in that single engagement.
More combat followed at the end of March as delaying actions against the Soviet advance were fought, but more tanks had to be blown up during the retreat to Hainfeld-St. Veit, and only 3 Tiger IIs made it back to Germany. Constant defensive action continued for s. The remains of s. This new battle group went into action on 15th April in the Traisen Valley and recaptured the town of St.
The defense of the town was bitter and, on the 18th, German forces retreated. The battalion reformed once more at the end of April in the area around Scheibss, Anton, and Neubruck and, in a desperate attempt to get more tanks, forty soldiers were sent to the nearby Nibelungen works to try to get six Jadgtigers operational.
This effort delivered two Jadgtigers but neither was of any use: one crashed through a bridge and was abandoned, the other was then blown up to block a street as an obstacle to the Soviet advance on 9th May, as the unit surrendered to US forces around Steyr.
On 9th February, this half-company was sent to Senne to collect more tanks and the delivery of 13 Tiger IIs followed up until 3rd March. Having seen no combat with its Tiger IIs, the unit was stripped of them and they were, instead, handed over to s. Deployed to the Railway Station at Kraks, three members of the crew were killed when a German soldier mistakenly attacked it with a Panzerfaust.
As a result, the unit effectively ceased to exist. Like SS. It was moved back to the Senne training area and reconstituted as s. In December , s. Delivery of Tiger IIs to complete this unit did not take place until the middle of February , with final delivery on 6th March for a total of 31 Tiger IIs.
With its new tanks, s. This was to be the first combat for the unit since being reestablished as s. It did not start well. The attack started slowly, as a delay in the cooperation between the infantry and Panzer advances had not been adequately coordinated. Nonetheless, not long after leaving the departure point, 2nd Company s. Abt had penetrated the lead enemy line of defense, but the overall attack had petered out as the inexperienced infantry were not exploiting the breach made by the tanks and several vehicles became disabled.
Poor positioning of the vehicles with the tanks parked too tightly together also left them more vulnerable to artillery fire and 4 of the precious tanks were subsequently damaged along with 2 of the highly important Bergepanther recovery vehicles. Without those, the unit would not be able to recover broken down or crippled tanks as easily. By the end of March , the unit had achieved very little except for continually being stuck in the mud or immobilized by accurate Soviet fire and were down to just 13 operational tanks.
The offensive had been an unmitigated failure of poor planning, inadequate coordination, and incompetent execution but, thankfully for s. Abt , the Soviets do not seem to have capitalized on this dysfunction and allowed the unit to withdraw back to Diedersdorf-Liezen for resupply. By the first week in April , s. By the time of the Soviet offensive on 16th April, 29 tanks were fit for service, spread between Petershagen-Sieversdorf 1st and 3rd Companies , and Dolgekin 2nd Company.
Poor tactical use once more hamstrung the effectiveness of the tanks and the slope of the ground created a large dead-spot for the Soviets, in which the guns of the Tiger II could not depress. More problems followed on the 18th, when, after repelling a Soviet attack the day before, one Tiger II accidentally engaged the commander of 2nd Company. Despite being relieved of his command for this near-fratricidal incident, the commander of the vehicle had to be reinstated the following day as there were simply not enough officers.
Heavy Soviet attacks on the 19th led to a withdrawal to Berkenbruck for 2nd Company, where it was engaged by Soviet forces 3 days later. Here, with tanks from 3rd Company the unit engaged in one of the few recorded instances of anti-infantry shelling, where they fired on Soviet infantry moving from Dolgelin to Heinersdorf about 3, m away from them. Pushed back once more towards Wilmersdorf, the unit finally found some palatable success for itself with the destruction of about 15 Soviet tanks by 3rd Company as the whole unit moved back to Bad Saarow by 25th April and then onto the forestry building at Hammer by 27th April.
Several vehicles were lost during these weeks of withdrawal due to mechanical failure or lack of fuel and were blown up, leaving just 14 Tiger IIs across 1st and 2nd Companies. Two more instances of the low quality of training of some of the crews occurred. A Tiger II tank crashed into a wheeled vehicle leading to an uncontrolled fire that lead to both vehicles being destroyed.
More chaotic withdrawal followed which, along with combat, contributed to numerous serious mechanical failures on the tanks, causing the crews to blow them up. By 1st May , just 2 operational Tiger IIs remained, although every member of the crews was wounded in some way and the unit was devoid of any wheeled vehicles all non-combat-essential wheeled vehicles were ordered blown up on 25th April and all remaining wheeled vehicles defueled on 28th April.
One of these was knocked out by a Panzerfaust and the final vehicle ran out of fuel and was abandoned near the town of Elshotz. At that point, the unit effectively ceased to exist and remaining troops tried to cross the Elbe to surrender to US forces.
Three Tiger IIs had actually been delivered on 30th January but were taken away from them shipped off to s. Abt since 31st January The next Tiger IIs for the unit came in the form of 7 vehicles which were actually taken directly from the Henschel factory at Kassel and took part in combat in that area. The unit was finally disbanded on 19th April When being equipped with Tiger IIs in November , s. Abt was renamed s. Abt and , which were renamed and , respectively.
The first 4 Tiger IIs for the unit had been received a month earlier, in October , with further deliveries arriving from December through January In a hint of the sort of dysfunction which hindered s. The first contact between this unit and the Soviets was also a disaster. Instead, the commander kept them on the train and at Stolzenberg they were ambushed by Soviet tanks and all captured without having managed to fire a shot in anger.
The remaining elements of 1st Company met with more success with an attack in the area of Regentin on 31st January, although several tanks were badly damaged by Soviet anti-tank gunfire, with one vehicle counting no less than 22 separate hits on its armor. By the start of February, 2nd Company s. Once more, though, the combat was dominated by tanks being crippled by accurate anti-tank gunfire breaking tracks and drive sprockets. Seven tanks were engaged in the defense of Arnswalde despite encirclement of the town by the Soviets.
They were to face repeated Soviet attacks for over a week before a breakout and relief force rescued all of the tanks although only 4 were operational on 17th February.
One notable part of the defense of this town was that the Tiger IIs used there ran out of ammunition for their 8. Tiger II of s. Several Ts were knocked out followed by efforts to relieve the siege at Arnswalde. Strength at this time was just 14 operational tanks with 25 undergoing repairs. On 3rd March, another disaster struck the unit when the train with some of their damaged tanks onboard derailed.
The unit tried to get back onto trains at Gollnow, having lost 9 tanks due to the derailment and a subsequent enemy attack forcing tanks to be blown up. Once on the train, the vehicles were loaded with their combat tracks, rather than the narrower transport tracks and this caused a lot of damage to passing trains on their way to Pasewalk. Two suffered serious mechanical breakdowns, another hit a tree and broke down, and the fourth was mistakenly filled with engine coolant instead of petrol, meaning it had to be evacuated for repair.
By the end of February, the unit was operating in the region of Dirschau. There, on 28th February, a Tiger II of 1st Company was hit by a shell on the ventilator on the turret roof, which penetrated the turret and killed the men inside. The driver and radio operator in the hull survived. Defensive actions continued through March, as the unit progressively fought a fighting retreat with intermittent contact with the Soviets up to the 21st and 22nd March, with the unit now in the city of Danzig.
The maintenance facility for s. That seventh tank was reused by German forces for a short period before being dumped in the harbor, but the reason for using it was obvious. Source: Schneider April was chaotic, as some of the unit remained in Danzig and the rest was moved around in the hope of assisting in the defense of Berlin with its dozen or so remaining vehicles. Maintenance for these was hampered not only by the constant movement but also the incessant combat. Whatever was being done was far too little far too late and the fall of Berlin was inevitable.
A breakout was attempted on 2nd May, but it was a total shambles. The Soviet forces covered the roads and the tanks were the subject of vigorous artillery and anti-tank fire.
The last Tiger II of s. These tanks were progressively lost through combat and breakdown and by 24th August the unit was at Maastricht-Mersen, having fought its way through Seclin, Tournay, Leuze, Waterloo, Lowen, and Tirelmont to get there. It was then ordered back to Paderborn for reconstitution. Tiger IIs of 3rd Company s.
Following this, the unit was involved in combat east of Szolnok and then in the area to the east of Budapest against the oncoming Soviet forces. Tiger II belonging to 2nd Company s. Source: Schneider On 20th October, 2nd Company and one platoon of 3rd company of s. The attack was successful with 36 enemy anti-tank guns destroyed but all but 3 of the German tanks were damaged.
The attacks were all successful and pushed back the advancing Soviets. More combat followed through the end of October consisting mainly of counter-attacks against the relentless Soviet advance culminating in the relief of the 24th Panzer Division By this time though the constant battling had reduced the strength of s. Throughout November , the battalion was engaged in almost daily combat with Soviet forces including some poorly directed actions conducted without infantry support or at night, but it still fought stubbornly against the advancing Soviet armor.
During this time the unit claims to have destroyed dozens of Soviet tanks although the advancing Soviets would be able to recover any knocked out tanks. The Germans, on the retreat, were forced to blow up their own tanks which became stuck or otherwise immobilized, and by December they were down to 40 tanks.
December was much the same as November: a string of counter-attacks to temporarily blunt the Soviet advance, followed by a withdrawal to a new position. Crippled tanks were blown up and the strength of the battalion progressively dwindled with total disaster on 7th December when the repair depot got cut off and they had to blow up 8 of their own tanks.
Source: Schneider s. Despite its best efforts, there was no stopping the Soviet advance and the constant combat and withdrawal had depleted the battalion. By 10th May, the remaining strength of around men gathered together, destroyed their vehicles including their last two Tiger IIs, and surrendered to US forces, who later handed them over to the Soviets as prisoners. Their unit diary claims more than 1, enemy tanks and 2, guns destroyed by the end of the war, more than any other Tiger battalion.
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